-------------
>
>INTELLIGENCE                                ISSN 1245-2122
>N. 88 New Series, 16 November 1998
>Every Two to Three Weeks
>Next Issue on 30 November1998
>Publishing since 1980
>
>
>Editor
>Olivier Schmidt
>(email  adi@ursula.blythe.org;
>web  http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence;
>tel/fax  33 1 40 51 85 19;
>post  ADI, 16 rue des Ecoles,
>75005 Paris, France)
>Copyright ADI 1998, reproduction in any form forbidden
>without explicit authorization from the ADI.  A one year
>subscription (18 issues with full index) is US $290.
>
>
>EXCLUSIVE REPORTS IN INTELLIGENCE
>
>     ITALY - SILVIO BERLUSCONI, THE MAFIA AND
>          "GRAND MEDIATORS," (N. 5)
>     FRANCE - REPORT ON THE "DIRECTION DU
>          RENSEIGNEMENT MILITAIRE" (N. 16)
>     SLOVAKIA - REACHING WEST WHILE SLIDING EAST (N. 51)
>     SOUTH AFRICA - EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES OR DIAMONDS ARE
>          A GRUNT'S BEST FRIEND (N. 55)
>     BULGARIA - A FIERY "FAR-WEST" FORTNIGHT IN SOFIA (N. 63)
>     GREAT BRITAIN/SAUDI ARABIA - JONATHAN AITKEN "TWISTS
>          SLOWLY IN THE WIND" (N. 64)
>     ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT & COVERT ACTION (N. 73)
>     EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES & SANDLINE
>          FORGE ON ... FOR PROFIT (N. 82)
>
>---------------------------------------------
>
>
>TABLE OF CONTENTS, N. 88, 16 November 1998
>
>
>FRONT PAGE
>
>USA/NICARAGUA - CIA'S "DAMAGE LIMITATION"
>          VERSION OF HISTORY p.1
>
>TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES
>
>KIDNAPPING AND ANTI-KIDNAPPING p.2
>CYBERCRIME WATCH GOES INTERNATIONAL p.3
>
>PEOPLE
>
>USA - JAMES CHARLES "ATOMIC DOG" KOPP p.4
>GREAT BRITAIN - IVOR ROBERTS p.5
>FRANCE - PIERRE-HENRI BUNEL p.6
>
>AGENDA
>
>COMING EVENTS THROUGH 1 JANUARY 1999 p.7
>
>INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD
>
>USA - CIA'S MIDDLE EAST ROLE & DST REORGANIZATION p.8
>     NSA CHANGES BOSSES AS ECHELON GOES TO CONGRESS p.9
>     FBI Wiretaps, Gun Data Base & Comsec Business. p.10
>     Open Source Intelligence. p.11
>GREAT BRITAIN - CLEAN UP SPIES & THE CYBER ZONE p.12
>FRANCE - "BOXING-IN" ISRAEL & "BOXING-OUT" THE US p.13
>GERMANY - SPD SPLITS INTELLIGENCE RIGHT & LEFT p.14
>WESTERN EUROPE - Open Source Intelligence. p.15
>RUSSIA - WORKING WITH THE FBI TO KEEP AFLOAT p.16
>EASTERN EUROPE - Open Source Intelligence. p.17
>COLOMBIA - TROUBLING BP OPERATIONS IN THE NAME OF OIL p.18
>LATIN AMERICA - Open Source Intelligence. p.19
>AFRICA - Open Source Intelligence. p.20
>ISRAEL/PALESTINE - SPIES IN THE OINTMENT p.21
>MIDDLE EAST - Open Source Intelligence. p.22
>ASIA - Open Source Intelligence. p.23
>
>---------------------------------------------
>
>
>FRONT PAGE
>
>
>Intelligence, N. 88, 16 November 1998, p. 1
>
>
>USA/NICARAGUA
>
>CIA'S "DAMAGE LIMITATION" VERSION OF HISTORY
>
>
>In a recently declassified 410-page internal report, former CIA
>Inspector General, Frederick Hitz, has confirmed that the CIA
>tolerated drug trafficking among leaders of the Nicaraguan
>Contra movement during the 1980s, that agency senior executives
>failed to inform Congressional representatives when questioned
>about reports that the Contras were trafficking in cocaine to
>finance their "low intensity" campaign to overthrow the
>Sandinista government, and that authorization for certain drug
>smuggling operations came directly from Ronald Reagan's
>National Security Council, approved by Lieutenant Colonel
>Oliver North, whose private liaison to the Contras was State
>Department official, Robert Owen, in charge of the Nicaraguan
>Humanitarian Aid Office (NHAO).  The report identifies 58 drug-
>implicated individuals belonging to various Contra groups who
>worked with CIA operatives.  In 11 cases, the report concluded
>that "no information had been found to indicate that any US law
>enforcement agency or executive branch agency was informed by
>the CIA of drug trafficking allegations," while, in six cases,
>"CIA knowledge of accusations or information indicating that
>organizations or individuals had been involved in drug
>trafficking did not deter their use or employment by [the]
>CIA".
>
>The report admits that the CIA had information linking 14
>pilots and two other people to cocaine transport and
>trafficking, including pilot George Morales, who was indicted
>by US federal authorities in the spring of 1984, shortly after
>the CIA broke off contact with operative Octaviano Cesar and
>the Contra Sandino Revolutionary Front.  Cesar was linked to
>Morales in a $3 million "guns for drugs" deal, but the report
>states that the agency "continued to have contact through 1984-
>87 with four of the [other] individuals involved with Morales".
>
>George Morales led a team of pilots who used the facilities of
>US rancher John Hull in northern Costa Rica to fly weapons to
>the Contras and return to the US with cocaine.  The cocaine was
>flown from Colombia to airstrips on the farmlands owned by Hull
>-- described as the CIA/NSC liaison to the Costa Rican-based
>Contras on the "southern front of the US war against Nicaragua"
>-- who was paid a $10,000 NSC monthly retainer, according to a
>staff report by Senator John Kerry, published in October 1986,
>and $300,000 per flight, according to Morales, in a CBS News
>report, on 6 April 1987.  The cocaine was supplied by Pablo
>Escobar and Jorge Ochoa, the two major Medellin cartel
>producers, which accounted for 80 percent of the cocaine
>reaching the US in the mid-1980s.  Hull and two right-wing
>Cuban Americans, Felipe Vidal and Rene Corvo, were paid by the
>Medellin bosses to provide labor and trans-shipment facilities.
>One of Morales' pilots, Gary Betzner, also told CBS News he had
>made two runs to Hull's ranch, involving "two small aircraft
>loads of weapons ... and returned to Florida with approximately
>1,000 kilos of cocaine".  Betzner estimated that the "guns for
>drugs" operations eventually netted the Contras "around forty
>million dollars".  A third pilot, Michael Tolliver, told CBS
>Newsday, in April 1987, that he was paid $75,000 to fly 28,000
>pounds of weapons to Aquacate Air Base in Honduras, where they
>were off-loaded by Contra troops.  His DC-6 returned to
>Homestead USAF base in south Florida, carrying 35,000 kilos of
>marijuana.
>
>Costa Rica was not the only trans-shipment option.  The Hitz
>report outlines the case of Carlos Amador who was flying
>"humanitarian aid" from Ilopango air base in El Salvador.  A
>CIA cable from the region, dated April 1986, claimed that a US
>Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) source stated that
>"Amador was probably picking up cocaine in San Salvador to fly
>to Grand Cayman and then to south Florida".  The cable warned
>that the DEA was planning to ask the local police to
>investigate Amador "and anyone associated with Hanger 4" --
>which was part of a military facility used to resupply the
>Contras after Congress cut off support in October 1984.
>Langley's response to the CIA Chief of Station in El Salvador
>was unequivocal:  "Would appreciate Station advising [DEA] not
>to make any inquiries to anyone re Hanger no. 4 at Ilopango
>since only legitimate, supported operations were conducted from
>this facility".  Hanger 4 operations were directly controlled
>by Lt. Col. Ollie North, who was spearheading Reagan's crusade
>against Communism in Central America, financed by cocaine
>smuggled into the US on planes chartered by US government
>agencies, while the president's wife spearheaded the Reagan
>administration's other major theme in the 1980s, the "War on
>Drugs", taking her anti-drug "Just Say No" crusade across
>America.  North was aware of the "guns for drugs" flights for
>at least a year before the CIA's cable regarding Amador and the
>DEA, writing in his notes, following a meeting with Robert Owen
>on 9 August 1985, that "the DC-6 which is being used for runs
>out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into
>the US".  Four months earlier, in a memo from Owen to North
>dated 1 April 1985, Costa Rican "freedom fighter", Jose Robelo,
>was described as being "potentially" involved in narcotics
>trafficking, while Contra leader Sebastian Gonzales was "now
>involved in drug running out of Panama".  The following year, a
>CIA back-channel message to North from the US ambassador in
>Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs, stated that yet another Contra
>overlord, Adolfo Chamorro, was also trafficking in cocaine.
>
>Despite the evidence, the CIA admitted to only one case of drug
>trafficking involving an anti-Sandinista organization in its
>classified briefings before House and Senate committees:  the
>ARDEN 15th of September group, which was disbanded in 1982.
>The IG's report accepts that neither the CIA nor its employees
>"conspired with or assisted Contra-related organizations or
>individuals in drug trafficking to raise funds for the Contras
>or any other purpose", and concluded that the CIA "acted
>inconsistently in handling allegations or information
>indicating that Contra-related organizations or individuals
>were involved in drug trafficking". Apart from the back-channel
>intelligence, dozens of NSC memos, and nearly 1,000 CIA cables
>from the field, the Reagan administration should have realized
>the extent of the "problem" in the early 1980s, specifically
>following the seizure of by US Customs of an estimated 500
>kilos of cocaine while being off-loaded from a Colombian
>freighter in San Francisco, in 1983.  The "frogman" bust was
>the largest ever made on the West Coast up to that point, and
>was linked to a Costa Rican-based Contra group, according to
>the "San Francisco Examiner", in March 1986.  Although court
>documents relating to the Contra connection were sealed, the
>newspaper disclosed that the US Treasury returned $36,020 which
>was confiscated as the proceeds of drug-trafficking, to Julio
>Zavala, one of the convicted smugglers, after he submitted
>letters from Contra leaders claiming the cash was "a political
>donation for the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua".  In
>court, Zavala testified that he delivered "about $500,000" to
>the Nicaraguan Democratic Union/Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed
>Forces (UDN/FARN) headed by Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, who
>worked closely with John Hull. Chamorro was later chosen by
>Ollie North to lead the "southern front" and work, with Bob
>Owen, on a unified strategy for Contras based in Costa Rica.
>
>The key figure in the "frogman" case was Nicaraguan expatriate,
>Norwin Meneses-Cantero, the brother of the former Managuan
>police chief under Somoza.  In a DEA report, dated 6 February
>1984, Meneses-Cantero is described as "the apparent head of a
>criminal organization responsible for smuggling kilogram
>quantities of cocaine into the United States".  The "Examiner",
>on 23 June 1986, reported that Meneses-Cantero bought a
>condominium in Miami for FDN military chief, Enrique Bermudez,
>and appeared at a 1984 Contra fundraiser in San Francisco with
>Contra leader, Adolfo Calero.  The sealed "frogman" papers also
>reveal that when Nicaraguan Contra supporter, Horacio Periera,
>was tried and convicted on narcotic charges, the Costa Rican
>government having produced transcripts of tapped conversations
>between Periera and Juan Sebastian Gonzales Mendiola, a close
>associate of John Hull.  According to CBS News, on 12 July
>1986, "in the conversations, the men discuss large amounts of
>cocaine they are sending to the US.  The wire-tapped phone
>calls show the drug dealers have ties to the highest level of
>leadership in Costa Rica."
>
>Apart from the Florida "air bridge", cocaine was also smuggled
>into the US from John Hull's ranch through two Miami-based
>seafood import companies, Mr. Shrimp and Ocean Hunter Inc.
>owned by Francisco "Paco" Chanes.  In 1985, Chanes and one of
>his associates, Moises Dagoberto Nunez, received $231,587 of a
>$27 million "humanitarian aid" package, paid by the NHAO to a
>Costa Rican shrimp firm called Frigorificos de Puntarenas, a
>subsidiary of Ocean Hunter Inc.  Some of this cash later turned
>up in bank accounts in Israel and South Korea, belonging to
>individuals supplying arms to the Contras.  In February 1986,
>the NHAO signed a contract for $97,000 with Michael Palmer,
>vice-president of Vortex, an air-freight company, to ship the
>"humanitarian package", almost ten months after Palmer received
>a three-month jail sentence in Colombia on drug-related
>charges.  On 19 June 1986, four months after signing the NHAO
>contract, Palmer was indicted on charges of conspiracy and drug
>possession, specifically in relation to his role in an
>operation which successfully smuggled 1,000 tons of marijuana
>from Colombia to the US between 1977 and 1986.  In September
>1987, Palmer escaped arrest in a joint DEA/FBI "sting"
>involving cocaine and marijuana valued at more than $40
>million, from Colombia to Michigan.
>
>The CIA also used Alan Hyde, a Honduran businessman, to
>transport guns by sea from mid-1987 to December 1988, despite a
>1984 Defense Department attache report which described Hyde as
>"making much money dealing in 'white gold' i.e. cocaine".
>According to a 1985 CIA cable, Hyde claimed he had a US Customs
>Service agent "in his pocket" and "friends in Cosa Nostra",
>and, in a July 1987 CIA cable, reported that the US Coast Guard
>had placed three ships owned by Hyde on alert lists.  Six years
>later, a 1993 CIA cable discouraged DEA efforts against Hyde
>because "his connection to the CIA is well documented and could
>prove difficult in the prosecution stage".  According to the
>Hitz report, there is no evidence that the CIA told the FBI,
>the DEA, or US Customs that it was using Mr. Hyde.
>
>The CIA/NSC Washington-based axis was fairly ruthless in
>dealing with "the opposition" as illustrated by the case of
>Barry Seal, a former TWA pilot busted by the DEA for cocaine
>trafficking in 1981.  Seal agreed to work undercover for the
>DEA in return for leniency.  During the following three years,
>he flew 50 trips to Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica.  By 1984,
>Seal had penetrated the highest levels of the Medellin cartel
>in what the DEA later described "the biggest and most promising
>drug investigation in history".  By this time, Seal was using
>small agricultural airstrips in southern Nicaragua to refuel,
>without the knowledge of the Sandinista Government in Managua,
>and had had a number of meetings with Pablo Escobar, who was
>temporarily living near the Costa Rican border, having fled
>Colombia when Medellin gunmen murdered the country's justice
>minister.  When the CIA learned of the DEA operation, and the
>Nicaraguan "connection", the Company decided that the
>information should be used to influence Congress to support aid
>for the Contras.
>
>In June 1984, during a meeting with Oliver North in the White
>House, the DEA assistant administrator, Frank Montestero,
>refused to release photographs of Seal and his plane refueling
>in Nicaragua.  Within days, on 17 June 1984, a report appeared
>in the "Washington Times" claiming the DEA had developed
>evidence that "a number of highly placed Nicaraguan officials",
>including Interior Minister Thomas Borge and Defense Minister
>Humberto Ortega, were involved in a drug smuggling ring
>supervised by the KGB.  The right-wing newspaper also claimed
>that the DEA information came from "a highly placed informer".
>The FBI later concluded that the newspaper report was based on
>classified information leaked by Oliver North.  The DEA
>immediately pulled Seal, ended its three-year investigation,
>and told the CIA that allegations about Nicaraguan ministers
>were untrue.  However, less than two years later, on 16 March
>1986, President Reagan, in a televised speech and picture-show,
>repeated the newspaper's false allegations, just prior to
>another Contra-aid vote by Congress.
>
>Persuaded by what the "LA Weekly" (September/October 1988)
>described as "the most dramatic disinformation campaign ever
>perpetrated on the American people", Congress reversed its ban
>on aid and approved $100 million in military assistance.
>Within a year of North's leaking details of the DEA
>investigation, Barry Seal was murdered because he had become a
>threat to CIA-sanctioned drug operations, and his personal
>belongings were seized by the FBI.  Details of the White House
>betrayal of Barry Seal emerged during House Crime sub-committee
>hearings in 1988, chaired by Democrat Rep. William Hughes.  DEA
>agent, Ernst Jacobsen, told the committee that the agency had
>lost the opportunity to arrest the leaders of the Medellin
>cartel because North leaked details of "the most significant
>investigation in DEA history".  He added "Mr. Seal was so well
>entrenched in the cartel, they were going to show him all their
>assets in the United States, all their storage areas in Georgia
>and Florida.  They were going to show him a 40,000 acre ranch
>in the Yucatan, Mexico, where they stored cocaine and from
>where they would fly it into the United States in small
>aircraft, four or five hundred 'keys' at a time.  They were
>going to show him their whole operation.  That's the first
>thing.  The second thing is that Mr. Seal had agreed to get all
>the cartel members at one place where they could be arrested.
>And we were in the process of doing that when the storm broke".
>
>The CIA had allies on the 1988 Senate Intelligence Committee,
>according to the IG report, including Mr. Hitz's successor as
>IG, L. Britt Snider, and the present CIA Director, George
>Tenet, both of whom were "not taken by the topic" and were
>"very frustrated" by the tasking from Senator John Kerry (D-
>Mass) and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) who were demanding that
>the CIA chief liaison with Congress, John Helgerson, answer
>questions on alleged Contra drug activity.  According to the
>report, Helgerson claimed not to recall "a concentrated effort
>by the agency to get to the bottom of the allegations of
>narcotics trafficking".  Mr. Helgerson pointedly told Senators
>Kerry and Pell that the CIA "was in the intelligence business
>not law enforcement".
>
>Another key player in the CIA-Contra-cocaine affair was Ramon
>Milian-Rodriguez, a Santa Clara University graduate employed by
>the CIA to carry funds to right-wing politicians, including
>Panamanian dictator, Manual Noriega.  In February 1988 a US
>federal grand jury indicted Noriega for accepting $5.4 million
>in cartel payoffs in exchange for "utilizing his position to
>sell the county of Panama to drug traffickers".  Milian-
>Rodriguez also worked as an accountant and money launderer for
>Pablo Escobar.  In an interview on CBS Newsday, 28 June 1987,
>he claimed that, from 1982 to 1985, he arranged to have $10
>million of Colombian narcotics profits distributed to Reagan's
>anti-Communist Contra allies through a network of couriers in
>Miami, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras.  The gesture was
>intended to win friends and influence policy on Capitol Hill,
>according to Milian-Rodriguez.  "The cartel figured it was
>buying a little friendship, they thought they were going to buy
>some goodwill and take a little heat off them.  They figured
>maybe the CIA or the DEA would not screw around so much" was
>how a member of the Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee, who
>questioned Milian-Rodriguez, in spring 1987, described the
>donation.
>
>Milian-Rodriguez also stated the "financial pipeline" was
>managed by veteran CIA agent, Felix Rodriguez, who arranged the
>money "drops".  Rodriguez worked closely with Oliver North,
>coordinating the supply of weapons and medical equipment from
>Ilopango airbase into Nicaragua.  He received assistance from
>George Bush, and met the US vice-president on three occasions
>to discuss the Contra "war effort."  Between 1984 and 1986, an
>estimated 50 to 100 CIA-arranged flights took off or landed at
>US airports without inspection by the US Customs Service, the
>"Boston Globe" claimed in April 1987, while CBS reported that
>the CIA had intervened to secure the release of Vortex boss,
>Michael Palmer, when he was detained by Customs officials in
>Miami after arriving on a flight from a South American.
>
>While the Reagan administration, through Attorney General Edwin
>Meese and US Attorney in Miami, Leon Kellner, deliberately
>intervened to prevent an investigation into illicit Contra-coke
>operations out of Miami, the Senate and House Select Committee
>on the Iran/Contra links was also turning a blind eye to the
>cocaine trafficking aspects of the affair.  In July 1988, the
>House Committee staff investigator, Robert Bermingham, in a
>secret memo to co-chairman, Senator Daniel Inouye, stated that
>"an exhaustive investigation ... had produced no evidence of
>Contra involvement in drug activity".  The chief investigator
>for the Senate Select Committee was Thomas Polgar, former CIA
>Chief of Station Saigon, and later CoS Mexico City until he
>retired in 1978 to work as a security consultant for Nicaraguan
>dictator, Anastacio Somoza, through the Miami-based company,
>Palumbo and Wilkinson (both names of former CIA officers) and
>later as consultant to George Bush's Task Force on Combatting
>Terrorism.
>
>The Hitz report has been described to "Intelligence" by a
>source as "a damage limitation exercise when there's no damage
>left to be done".  Indeed, the damage to inner city communities
>from the flood of cocaine has been considerable, yet the IG
>report still fails to fully answer many questions posed by the
>Washington-based research group, the National Security Archive
>(NSA).  In a memo (dated 6 July 1987) to the Select Committee
>on Narcotics Abuse and Control, the NSA asked:  "Were the field
>officers in Central America, the Caribbean and the US from the
>various agencies (DEA, Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
>Firearms, FBI) with jurisdiction over drug violations, aware of
>the Contra-drug allegations?  If not, why not?  If they were
>aware, where are their reports to their superiors?  How did law
>enforcement officers not know or report these allegations when
>Robert Owen clearly knew and reported them to Oliver North?
>What, if any, investigations were ever undertaken into these
>allegations?  What were the results of these investigations, if
>any?  Were law enforcement officers ever directed not to
>investigate?  What contacts, if any, did law enforcement
>officers have with other federal agencies, including the
>intelligence community, regarding these Contra-drug
>allegations?  Was the intelligence community involved in
>investigating these allegations?"
>
>The former acting director of the CIA in the late 1980s, Robert
>Gates -- who withdrew his nomination for the top job in 1987
>amid questions about his role in the Iran/Contra affair --
>stated in a 1987 memo to the head of the CIA's covert
>operations, that it was "absolutely imperative" that the agency
>avoid doing business with Central American drug traffickers.
>He later claimed that he regarded the Contra/cocaine
>allegations as a "critical problem" for the CIA, however the IG
>report found that Gates' (face-saving) memo had limited
>circulation within Langley, and concluded that the "guns for
>drugs" policy was "a matter of self-preservation" not only for
>the Contra program, but also for the CIA.
>
>NSC duplicity, CIA official silence and general media
>complacency, which facilitated the "guns for drugs" operation
>during the Reagan years, has been replaced by a revisionist
>view of history.  On 7 November, a CNN report on the aftermath
>of Hurricane Mitch, described the Aquacate air base in Honduras
>(used as a cocaine transshipment facility) as having been
>"built by Ronald Reagan in 1983 to help fight the spread of
>Communism in Central America".  No mention of the Contras who
>prosecuted the war or the drugs that helped supply the
>firepower.
>
>The body count has begun south of the border, and while the
>Company may not be involved this time, someone has begun to
>tidy up loose ends, with the murder of Helmer Pacho Herrera,
>one of the most ruthless Cali cartel bosses since the late
>1970s.  A business associate of Pablo Escobar for almost a
>decade, Herrera -- known as "the man of a thousand faces"
>because of frequent plastic surgery -- died while playing
>football earlier this month in the prison where he has been
>held since 1996.  Herrera joined the Cali cartel in the mid-
>1980s after a dispute with Escobar and was believed to have
>ordered a car-bomb attack on his former business partner's home
>in 1988.  Two years later, Escobar's gunmen shot dead 17 of
>Herrera's bodyguards at a remote Colombia farm.  Herrera
>escaped and launched a three-year manhunt for Escobar, which
>ended with his death on 2 December 1993.  Herrera was the last
>of the seven Cali bosses taken out of circulation.  According
>to sources in Bogota, he had begun to incriminate former
>associates in an effort to win lenient sentencing, when a well-
>dressed assassin embraced him on the playing field and shot him
>six times in the head.
>
>---------------------------------------------
>
>[...]
>
>---------------------------------------------
>
>Intelligence, N. 88, 16 November 1998, p. 9
>
>
>USA
>
>NSA CHANGES BOSSES AS ECHELON GOES TO CONGRESS
>
>
>According to Bill Gertz in the "Washington Times", NSA
>Director, Lieut. Gen. Ken Minihan (USAF), will retire in March,
>and the DIA Director, Lieut. Gen. Patrick Hughes (USA), will
>probably retire in February.  Also, Major Gen. John Casciano,
>USAF deputy for intelligence, will either retire or move up.
>The DDCI position is occupied by Lieut. Gen. Gordon (USAF) who
>has been in place only a year.  Leading contender for NSA
>Director, according to the report, is Lieut. Gen. Claudia
>Kennedy, Army DCSINT, who is being backed by the White House
>and Hillary Rodham Clinton.  If Kennedy becomes NSA chief, the
>Director and the Deputy Director -- Barbara McNamara -- will be
>women.  Other NSA contenders are Rear Admiral Tom Lowell
>Jacoby, DNI, and Rear Admiral Tom Wilson, JCS(DIA)/J2.  Gertz
>says Minihan requested a one-year extension at NSA but was
>turned down, and that DIA Director Hughes was not informed
>about planning for recent cruise missile strikes in Sudan and
>Afghanistan, a claim that has been denied elsewhere in the
>press.
>
>A Washington civil liberties organization, the Free Congress
>Foundation (FCF), has sent a detailed report on NSA's Echelon
>global electronic eavesdropping system to Congress in the hope
>that it will scrutinize Echelon as the European Parliament
>recently did, although the European venture looked like a flop.
>(3 reports)  The report, "Echelon - America's Spy in the Sky",
>details the known history and workings of the agency's global
>electronic surveillance system.  Patrick S. Poole, author of
>the report, is deputy director of the FCF.  Echelon is
>controlled by NSA and is operated in conjunction with the
>British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the
>Canadian Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the
>Australian Defense Security Directorate (DSD), and the New
>Zealand General Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).  These
>organizations are bound together under the secret 1948 UKUSA
>agreement.  The report described eavesdropping systems at
>Menwith Hill in England, including Steeplebush, Runway, Rutley,
>Pusher, Moonpenny, Knobsticks, GT-6, Troutman, Ultrapure,
>Totaliser, Silverweed, and Ruckus.  The report also goes over
>known eavesdropping campaigns in the US in detail, including
>Shamrock and Chaos.
>
>---------------------------------------------
>
>[...]
>
>---------------------------------------------
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